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Bakke and Weber: The Concept of Societal
Discrimination
INTRODUCTION

In the fifteen years since Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 1
became effective, the federal courts have gradually developed a legal definition of "discrimination." '2 A significant addition to that
definition was made by the United States Supreme Court's recent
decision in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber.8 The Court
held that an affirmative action plan, voluntarily undertaken as a
result of collective bargaining between the Steelworkers and Kaiser
Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, was permissable under Title
VII and did not constitute reverse discrimination.' The Court
found that the plan, which reserved half of the spaces in an onthe-job craft training program to minorities, was justified on the
basis of historical discrimination against blacks by the craft unions.' By considering the historical pattern and its present manifestations, the Court implicitly accepted the concept of societal
discrimination as a legal justification for affirmative action
programs.'
Societal discrimination is caused by broad social factors and attitudes, and is manifested by general patterns of inequality. The legal significance of the concept is that it is not ascribed to a particular entity, such as an employer, university, or governmental unit.
Rather it is the result of pervasive racism, which has affected the
structure and expectations of society, even absent intentional, discrete acts of discrimination. Where discrimination can be tied to a
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
2. See text accompanying notes 134 through 167 infra.
3. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
4. Id. at 2730. For a discussion of reverse discrimination in the civil rights field prior to
Weber, see Annot., 26 A.L.R. Fed. 13 (1976).
5. 99 S. Ct. at 2730.
6. The Court in Weber did not specifically use the term "societal discrimination"; rather,
it referred to "traditional patterns of racial segregation" and historical patterns of exclusion
of blacks from the craft unions. In University of CaliforniaRegents v. Bakke, the issue of
societal discrimination was specifically raised and discussed. 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1977).
7. One commentator has found that the Supreme Court's decisions on discrimination
generally have focused on the acts of the particular entity being accused of discrimination
(the perpetrator) rather than the considerations affecting the person discriminated against
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specific source it is legally actionable under various substantive
theories, including several titles of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,8 constitutional guarantees, 9 and the Reconstruction Statutes. 0 On the
other hand, societal discrimination is a justification for voluntary
affirmative action, rather than a basis for legal liability and corrective relief.
This article will examine the Court's understanding and use of
the concept of societal discrimination. The decision in University
of CaliforniaRegents v. Bakke," where the concept was rejected,' 2
will be contrasted with the Court's apparent acceptance of the
same justification in Weber. Finally, this aspect of Weber will be
analyzed in the context of the development of the legal definition
of discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
WEBER AND BAKKE

The Factual Context
The Weber case arose out of the 1974 master contract between
the Steelworkers and Kaiser covering fifteen Kaiser plants nationwide, and its specific application at the Gramercy, Louisiana
plant.' 3 The contract contained an affirmative action plan for the
company's craft training program. The plan provided that one minority employee was to be selected for each non-minority employee
chosen for the program, until the percentage of minority craft
workers reached the goal set by the individual plant.14 The selec(the victim). Only in the employment area has the Court viewed the problem from the perspective of the victim. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049
(1978).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (1976).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIII, XIV.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1976).
11. 438 U.S. 265 (1977).
12. Id. at 310.
13. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2725 (1979).
14. The contract provision at issue stated:
It is further agreed that the Joint Committee will specifically review the minority
representation in the existing Trade, Craft and Assigned Maintenance classifications, in the plants set forth below, and, where necessary, establish certain goals
and time tables in order to achieve a desired minority ratio: [Gramercy Works
listed, among others]. As apprentice and craft jobs are to be filled, the contractual
selection criteria shall be applied in reaching such goals; at a minimum, not less
than one minority employee will enter for every non-minority employee entering
until the goal is reached unless at a particular time there are insufficient available
qualified minority candidates.
1974 Labor Agreement, Addendum to Art. 9, quoted in Weber v. Kaiser Aluminium &
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tion of trainees was otherwise based on seniority. Separate seniority rosters for each race were set up solely for selection into the
program.' 5 The expressed justification for the plan was to increase
minority representation in craft positions." At the Gramercy plant
the goal was set at thirty-nine percent, based on the percentage of
of the two parishes from
minorities in the general population
17
which the plant drew its workers.
The impact of historic discrimination by the craft unions was
clearly evident at Gramercy. Prior to 1974, Kaiser received five
years experience in the trade to qualify for employment.' 8 Despite
active recruitment of minorities, in 1974 blacks accounted for only
1.83% (five of 273) of the craft positions at the plant. Few blacks
could meet the experience requirement because prior discrimination by the unions had thwarted the opportunity for training and
experience.'
The situation at Gramercy did not escape the attention of the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC).2 0 The OFCC apparently pressured Kaiser to develop an affirmative action plan to
remedy the scarcity of black craft workers and the general underrepresentation of blacks in the overall plant workforce."s Kaiser
and the Steelworkers were also vulnerable under Title VII to both
private suits and federal pattern and practice suits."2 In this sense,
Chemical Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 222 (5th Cir. 1977).
15. Id. at 218 n.1.
16. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2725 (1979).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2731.
19. Id. at 2725.
20. Id. at 2731.
21. Id. The overall labor force at the Gramercy plant showed a significant under-representation of blacks. The plant opened in 1958 with a "no discrimination" policy, but by 1969
had only 10% black employees. In 1969 the company instituted a policy of hiring at the gate
on the basis of one white, one black, but by the time of trial, blacks still constituted only
14.8% of the total labor force. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminium & Chemical Corp., 415 F. Supp.
761, 764 (E.D. La. 1976).
22. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminium & Chemical Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 229 (5th Cir. 1977)
(dissenting opinion of Wisdom, J.). At the time the 1974 contract was negotiated between
the Steelworkers and Kaiser, the Steelworkers and nine major steel producers were being
investigated by the federal government for discrimination in craft positions. The investigation resulted in a pattern and practice suit brought by the EEOC under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f) (1976). The suit was settled by the simultaneous filing of a consent decree. See United
States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus. Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975). The provisions of the
consent decree were virtually identical to the plan negotiated with Kaiser. The consent decree was entered in April, 1974, and was the product of six months negotiation between the
government and the potential defendants. The Kaiser-Steelworkers contract was agreed to
in February, 1974. 563 F.2d at 229.
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the Kaiser plan was not "voluntary," but instead a "preventive"
measure to avoid future legal liability.
By contrast, the affirmative action plan at issue in the Bakke
case was initiated free from any direct governmental pressure. It
followed a national trend of educational programs aimed at in,creasing minority representation in the medical profession. s The
Medical School of the University of California at Davis (Davis) set
up a special admissions program in 1971, which reserved sixteen
out of 100 places for students who were "economically or educationally disadvantaged. 2 4 Under the special program academic
factors were assigned less weight than in the general admissions
program.2 5
Davis initiated the program after finding the general admissions
program.yielded a low percentage of minority admissions. The first
class, in 1968, had a class of fifty students, with a minority representation of three Asians.2 6 Throughout the period when the special admissions program was in effect, this pattern continued.
From 1971 to 1974, when each entering class numbered 100, the
general program admitted one black, six Mexican-Americans, and
thirty-seven Asians. During this same period, twenty-one blacks,
thirty Mexican-Americans, and twelve Asians were admitted under
the special program.2
The justification for the Davis program rested on four grounds:
(1) reducing the historic deficit of minorities in medicine; (2) counterbalancing the effects of societal discrimination; (3) increasing
the number of physicians to serve minority communities; and (4)
diversifying the student body.2 8 These justifications reflected concern over the significant under-representation of minorities at Da-

23. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 369 n.45 (1977).
24. Id. at 274, 279. Although this broad descriptive term was used for the program, the
program was confined to Blacks, Chicanos, Asians and American Indians. No whites were
accepted into the special admissions program although whites applied. Id. at 274-76.
25. Under the program no minimum grade point average was required; the general admissions program summarily rejected applicants with less than a 2.5 grade point average on
a scale of 4.0. Under the special program, one of five applicants were invited for an interview; under the general program the ratio was one of six. Applicants in both categories were
assigned a "benchmark score" composed of the objective factors of college grades and scores
on the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT), subjective factors such as extracurricular
activities and other experiences, and the results of the interview. Applications in the special
program were reviewed by a special committee and its recommendations were then sent to
the general admissions committee. Id. at 273-75.
26. Id. at 272.
27. Id. at 275, 276 n.6.
28. Id. at 306.
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examvis and in the medical profession in general. As of 1975, for
2
ple, blacks constituted only five percent of all physicians. 9
Judicial scrutiny of the Weber and Bakke programs resulted
from charges that the programs constituted "reverse discrimination." It was alleged that they preferred minorities over more qualified whites and thus discriminated against whites on the basis of
race. Weber's higher qualification was greater seniority than blacks
accepted into the training program; 0 Bakke's higher qualifications
were test scores and grades above those of students admitted
through the special admissions program. 1 Bakke based his claim
on Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act s' and the equal protection
clauses of the federal s and California 4 constitutions; Weber based
29. Id. at 369-70. The 5% figure reflected a recent increase. The percentage was 2.2% in
1950 and had remained fairly constant until 1970. Id.
30. 99 S. Ct. at 2725. The District Court noted that the contract provision was administered in the following fashion: In April, 1974, Kaiser posted openings for instrument repairman, electrician and general repairman, and selected one black and one white for the first
two positions, and three blacks and two whites for the third position. In October, 1974,
openings were posted for insulator and carpenter, and one black was selected for the first
position, one black and one white for the second position. Kaiser admitted at trial that
blacks with less seniority than whites had been chosen. Brian Weber had been an employee
for seven years at Kaiser. 415 F. Supp. at 763-64.
31. 438 U.S. at 277 n.7. Part of the trial record was a comparison of Bakke's grade point
average and MCAT scores to average scores of regular and special admittees in the two
years that Bakke applied to Davis:
Bakke
1973

1974

Regular
Admittees
1973 1974

science GPA

3.44

3.44

3.51

3.36

2.62

2.42

overall GPA

3.46 3.46

3.49

3.29

2.88

2.62

Special
Admittees
1973 1974

MCAT verbal

96

96

81

69

46

34

MCAT quantitative

94

94

76

67

24

60

MCAT science

97

97

83

82

35

37

MCAT gen. information

72

72

69

72

33

18

Id.
32.

42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.
33. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part:
"[N]or shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."
34. Cal. Const. art. I, § 21 provides;
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his claim solely on Title VII.35
The Supreme Court upheld Bakke's claim and ordered his admission to medical school, finding that the Davis program contained an impermissible racial quota." The Court, however, also
held that race could be used as a factor in admissions. 87 A year
later the Court denied similar relief to Weber, finding the Kaiser
plan permissible under Title VII." In both cases a vigorous argument was made that societal discrimination was a sufficient legal
basis for the affirmative action plans at issue. 8
The Bakke Decision
Justice Powell's opinion 40 in Bakke characterized societal dis"No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted
privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens."
35. Weber specifically based his claim on §§ 703(a) and (d) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2(a) and (d) (1976). 99 S. Ct. at 2725-26. Section 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Section 703(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization,
or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training
or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission
to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other
training.
36. 438 U.S. at 319-20; see note 40 infra.
37. 438 U.S. at 318-20.
38. 99 S. Ct. at 2730.
39. See note 6 supra. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, who shared this
view, were the minority in Bakke; they were joined by Justice Stewart in the Weber
majority.
40. No single opinion commanded a majority of the Bakke court. Justice Powell concluded that the Davis program violated the equal protection clause, but that race could be
used as a factor in admissions. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Rehnquist, and Justice Stewart, concurred in the conclusion that the Davis program was
impermissible, but reached this result on the basis of Title VI, and therefore did not reach
the constitutional issue. Justice Stevens did not voice an opinion on whether race could be
used as a factor in admissions because under his analysis that issue was not presented for
review. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, in a joint opinion, concluded that
the Davis program was permissible under either a Constitutional or statutory analysis. They
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crimination as "an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past."'" Impliedly interpreting the concept
as a "compensation for past wrongs" or "guilt complex" approach,
whereby race-conscious programs would be measured against a historical catalogue of racial injustice,"" Justice Powell maintained
that such a justification for affirmative action programs would have
to be predicated on legislative or judicial findings, not on the isolated determination of an educational institution. 8 Such findings
would convert "societal discrimination" into "identified discrimination" by subjecting the matter to legislative and judicial controls." These controls would serve to minimize the impact of remedial measures on innocent parties who were not themselves
responsible for discrimination." In order to constitute "legal," as
opposed to mere "societal" discrimination, general patterns of discrimination would have to be examined to find their specific
appropriate relief within defined boundaries could
source, so that
6
applied.4
be
Of the three remaining rationales offered for the Davis program,
Justice Powell found only the desire for diversity in the student
body to be a legitimate state interest.4 7 Since the plan involved a
racial classification, Justice Powell determined that strict scrutiny
should apply in analyzing whether this interest was sufficient to

agreed that race could be used as a factor in admissions. Individual opinions were also filed
by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun. Justice White focused exclusively on Title VI.
Justices Marshall and Blackmun further explained their support for the joint opinion.
For a comprehensive look at Bakke, see the symposium on the case, 67 CALU'. L. REV.
(1977). See generally Knowlton, Commentary: Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 32 ARK. L. REV. 499 (1978); Maltz, Commentary, A Bakke Primer, 32 OKLA. L. REV.
119 (1979); Baldwin & Nagan, Board of Regents v. Bakke: the All-American Dilemma Revisited, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 843 (1978).
41. 438 U.S. at 307.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 309.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 308. Justice Powell thus analyzes the problem from the perspective of the
"perpetrator" rather than the "victim." See note 7 supra.
46. Id. at 308 n.44. Justice Powell emphasized that nothing in the record substantiated
the argument that the factors used in the regular admissions program, grades and test
scores, were culturally or racially biased. He further noted that such an argument was an
attempt to transfer the disparate impact analysis of Title VII cases to this case. He pointed
out that Title VII was supported by legislative findings that disparate impact could be
traced to particular sources of discrimination and concluded, "Title VII principles support
the proposition that findings of identified discrimination must precede the fashioning of
remedial measures embodying racial classifications." Id.
47. Id. at 311.
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permit race-conscious action.48 Measured by this standard, the Davis plan unnecessarily abridged individual rights by limiting access
to the special admissions program by race.4'9 Although race could
be used as a factor in the admissions process, Justice Powell held
that race could not be used to deny consideration for any
opening.
Justices Burger, Rehnquist, Stewart and Stevens agreed that the
Davis program was impermissible, but based their conclusion on
Title VI rather than constitutional grounds.5 1 Justice Stevens,
writing for this group, stated that under general principles of appellate review, statutory analysis is favored over constitutional
scrutiny. Thus, Title VI should be preferred over equal protection
as a basis for decision.5 2 Justice Stevens interpreted Title VI as an
independent force which strengthens constitutional proscriptions
of discrimination, thereby imposing a higher standard of review
than the equal protection clause.53 Based on a literal reading of
Title VI, Stevens argued that the statute imposed a standard of
racial neutrality or "color blindness" that cannot be abridged regardless of whether the discrimination is invidious or benign." Analyzed under this standard, the Davis program clearly violated the
statute.5 5
In a joint opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Jus-

48. Id. at 291.
49. "The fatal flaw in petitioner's preferential program is its disregard of individual
rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 320.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 412. An issue raised in Bakke and not clearly decided was whether a private
cause of action existed under Title VI. The trial court had based its decision in favor of
Bakke on Title VI and the equal protection clause. The California Supreme Court had applied an equal protection analysis to reach the same conclusion. Justices Stevens, Burger,
Rehnquist and Stewart supported the view that a private cause of action existed under Title
VI. Id. at 416. Justice White took the opposite view. Id. at 329. Justice Powell assumed
without deciding that a private cause of action existed, id. at 283, and concluded that Title
VI proscribed only those racial classifications that would violate the equal protection clause.
He analyzed the case under equal protection principles. Id. at 287. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed with Justice Powell to the extent that they felt it was not necessary to decide whether Title VI provided for a private cause of action. Id. at 328.
52. Id. at 412.
53. Justice Stevens argued for a standard of review more stringent than strict scrutiny. A
compelling state interest may overcome a racial classification, although strict scrutiny has
usually resulted in a finding of unconstitutionality. See e.g., Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944). Under Title VI, Justice Stevens asserted, there is no room for any
balancing: the prohibition on racial classifications is absolute. Id. at 416.
54. Id. at 416-18.
55. Id. at 412-13.
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tices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun maintained that
neither the Constitution nor Title VI required the "colorblind"
5
standard,"
but that both permit the use of race-conscious programs to achieve the goal of racial equality.

7

They noted that the

Court has never declared racial classifications to be per se invalid
under the equal protection clause.' They also pointed to race-conscious remedies approved by the Court in school desegregation and
employment discrimination cases.' 9
In discussing Title VI, these justices found that the legislative
history and purpose behind the passage of the statute supported
the use of race-conscious remedies for discrimination." The statute
was designed to give the federal government clear authority to cut
off funding where the recipient discriminated on the basis of race,
so that the federal government would not be indirectly fostering
discrimination.6 ' Title VI therefore reinforces the equal protection
clause by clarifying the federal government's authority to reach
private recipients of federal funding. It does not impose a higher
standard of scrutiny of racial classifications than the standards imposed by the equal protection clause.62
The joint opinion also cited regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to enforce Title VI.
These regulations state a preference for voluntary action over punitive measures to achieve the goals of the statute." It would be
inconsistent to find that the same statute required affirmative action where discrimination is specifically found, but prohibited af56.

Id. at 327. The opinion went on to state:
Against this background, claims that law must be 'colorblind' or that the datum of
race is no longer relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration rather than
as description of reality. This is not to denigrate aspiration; for reality rebukes us
that race has too often been used by those who would stigmatize and oppress
minorities. Yet we cannot. . . let color blindness become myopia which masks the
reality that many 'created equal' have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior
both by the law and by their fellow citizens. Id.
57. Id. at 336-40.
58. Id. at 356, 397. These justices, in contrast to Justice Powell's position, argued that
under a constitutional analysis the standard of review applied to benign racial classifications
should be an intermediate one; that is, less stringent than strict scrutiny. Id. at 359. For
further analysis of this intermediate standard, see Tribe, Perspectiveson Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structural Justice, 92 HARV. L. REv. 864 (1979).
59. Id. at 362-63, 365.
60. Id. at 329.
61. Id. See also Justice White's separate opinion, which focused solely on the issue of a
private cause of action under Title VI. Id. at 379-86.
62. Id. at 328. See also id. at 384 (opinion of White, J.).
63. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(6)(i), (ii) (1977).
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firmative action when voluntarily undertaken to counter societal
discrimination."
These justices viewed the Constitutional and statutory proscriptions against discrimination as inextricably tied to the social context in which they operate. 6 5 While these proscriptions express a
principle of equality, that principle cannot be divorced from the
reality of pervasive discrimination which necessitated their passage.66 A historical perspective is crucial, not to identify a list of
past grievances, but to understand present conditions.6 7 Further,
the principle of racial equality, as reflected in contemporary law, is
of relatively recent vintage." Although laws, such as the Reconstruction Statutes, embodied this principle over a century ago, its
actual realization has begun only in the last twenty-five years.69
Contemporary legislative and judicial attempts to achieve racial
equality require both adherence to that principle and the use of
remedial and preventive measures. 0
The joint opinion concluded that voluntary affirmative action
plans should be permitted to rest on a reasonable finding of societal discrimination.7 1 The question raised in Bakke, then, was
whether racial preference could be justified by the pattern of societal discrimination in the medical profession. The statistical underrepresentation of minorities in medicine, as well as the results of
Davis' regular admissions program, supported such a finding, when
considered against the background of the legal disabilities of
blacks in education until the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of
Education7 2 and the resistance to integration after Brown.78 This
combination of factors led to the conclusion that, but for this prior

64. 438 U.S. at 340.
65. Id. at 327.
66. Id. at 326-27.
67. Id. at 327.
68. Id. at 326-27. Justice Marshall stated in his separate opinion:
For it must be remembered that, during most of the past 200 years, the Constitution as interpreted by this Court did not prohibit the most ingenious and pervasive forms of discrimination against the Negro. Now, when a State acts to remedy
the effects of that legacy of discrimination, I cannot believe that this same Constitution stands as a barrier. Id. at 387.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 340 n.17, 353-54, 362-68.
71. Id. at 362.
72. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County School Bd. of New
Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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and persisting discrimination, minorities would qualify for regular
admission to medical school in approximate proportion to their
representation in the general population.
These justices found that the Davis program was a reasonable
approach to compensating for the effects of discrimination.
Whether a racial quota is used or whether race is used as a factor,
they argued, is not constitutionally significant; rather, the key
question is whether any racial preference is justified.7 In this case,
the Davis program could achieve its goal only if it were limited to
the minorities.76 Otherwise, the absolute number of "educationally
and economically disadvantaged" whites would overwhelm the
number of minority applicants." Furthermore, the program did
not stigmatize whites as inferior nor deny them access to
78
admissions.
The joint opinion in Bakke thus took a practical approach to
reaching the goal of a racially "unconscious" society. Under this
approach, societal discrimination is a flexible concept. The stress is
on current indicators of persisting racism, on how society operates
in fact. Such a finding of societal discrimination would justify raceconscious action, for "[in] order to get beyond racism, we must
79
first take account of race.
The Weber Decision
In Weber,8 0 societal discrimination was accepted as a legal justification for a voluntary affirmative action program. 81 Justice Stewart joined Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun to
form a majority holding the Kaiser plan permissible under Title
VII. a2 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan took judicial no74. 438 U.S. at 365-66.
75. Id. at 378-79.
76. Id. at 377.
77. For instance, white applicants constituted 71% of applicants to medical schools from
students whose annual family income was less than $10,000. Also, in 1970, families headed
by a person not a high school graduate were 80% white and 20% racial minorities. Id. at
376-77.
78. Id. at 375. Neither did it stigmatize minority students. After admission such students
had to fulfill all the requirements for graduation on the same basis as students admitted
through the regular program. Id. at 376.
79. Id. at 407 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). See also Dworkin, Why Bakke Has No Case,
N.Y. REV. BooKs, Nov. 10, 1977, at 11.
80. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
81. See note 6 supra.
82. 99 S. Ct. at 2730. Justice Stewart did not write a separate opinion in either case.
Weber was a 5-2 decision, with Justices Stevens and Powell not participating.
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tice of the history of discrimination against blacks by the craft unions.s The statistical picture at the Gramercy plant supported the
conclusion that the effects of such discrimination persisted.8 This
situation, the Court held, was precisely the kind of discrimination
Title VII was meant to correct."s In passing Title VII, Congress
was concerned with the high rate of black unemployment.8 6 Equal
access to employment was viewed as a, prerequisite to enjoying
other rights guaranteed by the 1964 Civil Rights Act.87 Justice
Brennan reasoned that Title VII must be read in the context of
this legislative history as well as the general history of discrimination against blacks.8 8 The prohibition against racial discrimination
contained in sections 703(a) and (d) 8 ' could not be applied literally, because to do so would be inconsistent with the remedial purpose of the statute.9 0
Section 703(j) of Title VIP 1 precludes an interpretation of the
statute which would require racially preferential hiring solely to
maintain racial balance. Justice Brennan read this section to mean
that voluntary race-conscious programs would be permitted, 2 noting that Title VII encourages voluntary action.' 3 Since race-con-

83.

Id. at 2725 n.1.
84. Id. at 2725.
85. Id. at 2730.
86. The relative rate of unemployment of blacks as compared to whites was 64% higher
in 1947, 124% higher in 1962, and 129% higher in 1978. Id. at 2727, 2728 n.4.
87. Id. at 2727.
88. Id. at 2730.
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a),(d) (1976). See note 35 supra.
90. Id. at 2727.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976) provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual
or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such
individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to
the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by
any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship
or other training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of
persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community,
State, section, or other area. . ..
92. 99 S. Ct. at 2729.
93. Id. at 2728. The enforcement provisions of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) and (f)
(1976), specifically require that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission attempt
voluntary conciliation prior to filing suit against a party.
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scious programs have been upheld where ordered by the courts,' 4 it
would be contrary to the spirit of Title VII not to permit them to
be voluntarily instituted by an employer aware of the effects of
racial discrimination on his employment practices. 5 To prohibit
such voluntary action would mean that an employer or union
would have to be exposed to legal liability before affirmative action
would be justified. 6 Title VII does not require such a paradoxical
result; rather, voluntary affirmative action may be based on evidence of societal discrimination, including union and employer re7
fusal to train and hire in the past.'
Although the Court refused to define precisely the boundaries of
reasonable and permissible affirmative action, it noted several factors about the Kaiser plan that weighed in its decision. The plan:
(1) opened job opportunities in an area traditionally closed to
blacks; (2) did not unnecessarily impinge on whites, in that it assured whites access to the training program and did not displace
any incumbent white; and (3) was temporary, in that it sought to
achieve a defined goal rather than insure or sustain a particular
racial balance.' 8
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, conceded that reliance on societal discrimination at first glance appeared to be overly
broad, and that a more limited, "arguable violations" approach

94. 99 S. Ct. at 2729. Court-ordered preferential remedies and quota relief have been
challenged under the "no preference" section, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(), but the courts have
uniformly rejected such arguments. The short response has been that the section applies to
employers, not to the courts. Section 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), of Title VII confers
upon the courts broad authority to grant equitable relief, including preferential and quota
remedies. EEOC v. American Tel. and Tel., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977); EEOC v. Local 638,
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n., 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Ironworkers
Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971); Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 780 (E.D.
Va. 1977). Courts which have analyzed the statutory issue in more detail have argued that
"[a]ny other interpretation would allow complete nullification of the stated purposes of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964." United States v. IBEW Local No. 638, 428 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir.
1970). See also United states v. Wood, Wire and Metal Workers' Int'l Union, Local 46, 471
F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973); S. Ill. Builders Ass'n. v. Oglivie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973). The role of the courts in providing
affirmative relief is not merely to admonish, but also to compensate for discrimination and
prevent its future occurrence. Quota relief is an extreme form of relief and has been applied
sparingly, but it has been found necessary in some cases to practically achieve the goals of
Title VII.
95. 99 S. Ct. at 2729.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2728, 2730.
98. Id. at 2730.
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might appear to provide a more suitable standard.9 ' The "arguable
violations" standard would permit voluntary affirmative action
only when the employer or union had committed an apparent violation of Title VII.OO Justice Blackmun pointed out, however, that
although the approach was appealing, its adoption would encourage litigation and defeat the purpose of Title VII. 10 1 Employers would have to determine when they had committed acts sufficient to meet the standard of an "arguable violation" without
going beyond the standard into the realm of actual violation and
hence legal liability.
The broad standard actually adopted by the Court avoids this
dilemma for employers; it does not require that the employer approach a violation or actually violate Title VII. Rather, it permits
the employer to look to statistical disparity alone to determine if
affirmative action is necessary. This standard also allows the employer to remedy discrimination beyond the scope of Title VII,
that is, pre-Act discrimination.1 0 2 Justice Blackmun's analysis un-

99. Id. at 2731.
100. Judge Wisdom suggested this approach in his dissenting opinion to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Weber. 563 F.2d at 227-239. Judge Wisdom noted that the posture of the
parties in the Weber case had limited the amount of information available to the court
concerning past employment practices. Kaiser had no motive to offer evidence which would
tend to show its own legal liability for any past acts of discrimination; the same rationale
applied to the union. Such evidence would also have undercut Weber's claim and provided a
premise for court-ordered affirmative action, so Weber himself was not likely to have produced the information. Minority employees were not parties to the suit. Id. at 231.
Nonetheless, Judge Wisdom argued, the limited evidence in the record could theoretically
have supported a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII. The statistical disparity between black employees and black representation in the general population, the fiveyear experience requirement for craft positions, unjustified by business necessity, and the
requirement of prior training for some craft jobs all pointed to an "arguable violation" of
Title VII. Id. at 231-232. A voluntary program to correct the situation would have been
justified on the basis that legal liability should not be a prerequisite for affirmative action. If
this were not the case, an employer would be made to walk a "tightrope" of acting under the
affirmative duty of Title VII to correct discriminatory practices while being required to limit
his actions so that they would not impinge on the expectations of white employees. Id. at
230.
101. 99 S. Ct. at 2733. (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
102. Id. at 2733. In Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) the Court examined
a seniority system which acted to preserve the present effects of past discrimination. In
finding the system to be bona fide and therefore exempt from Title VII under section
703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), the Court held that discriminatory hiring which had ceased
with the passage of the Act could not be reached by the statute. See note 156 infra. Weber
would permit voluntary action to remedy such pre-Act discrimination. As Justice Blackmun
remarked: "Absent compelling evidence of legislative intent, I would not interpret Title VII
itself as a means of 'locking in' the effects of segregation for which Title VII provides no
remedy." 99 S. Ct. at 2733.
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derscores the usefulness of the concept of societal discrimination
as a flexible tool for determining the necessity and scope of voluntary affirmative action.
The dissenters in Weber, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, advanced the same statutory argument for Title VII that
they had supported with regard to Title VI in Bakke. Title VII,
they argued, is clear on its face and requires no inquiry into legislative history or social context. The statute proscribes all race-conscious employment decisions, and therefore the Kaiser program
was illegal."'0 Justice Rehnquist further pointed out that an examination of the legislative history reinforces the position that racial
14
preference is neither required nor permitted under the statute. 0
A Comparison of the Weber and Bakke Decisions
The decision of the Court in Weber upholding voluntary affirmative action appears to inconsistent with Bakke. It is difficult to distinguish the cases on a factual basis. Both cases involved the use of
a racial quota, and in Weber the quota involved a much higher
percentage of the total number of available positions. Both quotas
were tied to the goal of achieving the racial representation that
would have occurred but for discrimination. In Weber, this goal
was expressed as a specific figure: when 39% of the craft workers
were minorities, the training program would no longer operate on
an affirmative action basis. In Bakke, this goal was implicit in the
reasons for developing the program: when minorities were adequately represented through the regular admissions process, the
special program would become unnecessary. Both programs were
premised on evidence of substantial and pervasive societal discrimination. In Weber, this evidence was bolstered by the possibility
that hiring policies and qualifications for specific jobs were themselves discriminatory. In Bakke, a similar presumption of discrimination could have been applied to the "objective" factors of grades
and MCAT scores, since these reflect the discriminatory effects of

103. 99 S. Ct. at 2734, 2736 (dissenting opinion of Burger, C.J.).
104. Id. at 2752 (dissenting opinion of Rehnquist, J.). A persistant objection to Title VII
which had been raised by its opponents during debate over its passage was that the absence
of a definition of "discrimination" in the statute would allow the federal government to
require employers to maintain a racial balance. The proponents of the bill had consistently
stated that Title VII did not allow this result. Section 703(j) was added to the law to clarify
that "no preference" could be imposed on employers. Justice Rehnquist concluded from this
legislative history that a strict statutory reading of Title VII was required and that the
majority position deviated from the express meaning of the statute. Id. at 2752-53.
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unequal education. Both programs denied whites access to a certain number of positions, but did not totally deny them the ability
to gain the benefit involved. The denial to whites implied no racial
stigma, but it constituted a limitation on their prior expectations.
Neither of the programs stigmatized blacks: blacks were not chosen solely because of race, but had to meet basic qualifications. Finally, both programs were reasonable and practical approaches to
achieving the socially desirable goal of racial equality.
The difference in the legal theories underlying the decisions also
does not serve to explain the different results. The Court has held
that before strict scrutiny under the euqal protection clause will be
applied, there must be a showing of discriminatory purpose or intent. 100 Until such intent is shown there will be an assumption that
the state has acted reasonably. 106 Disparate impact 0 7 alone is not
sufficient to raise an inference of discriminatory purpose unless it
is "stark."108 Under Title VII, on the other hand, disparate impact
is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.1 0 9
Good or bad intent is irrelevant. 11 0 The presumption is that racially disparate effects are the result of discriminatory practices,
absent a strong countervailing explanation.'
The different levels of review imposed by equal protection analysis and Title VII analysis suggest that if the difference in legal the-

105. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Davis, the Court reviewed a challenged testing program for
the Washington, D.C. police department that had a disproportionate disqualifying effect on
black applicants. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had improperly applied Title VII standards to decide a constitutional issue. Under an equal protection clause
analysis, racially discriminatory purpose must be shown; disparate impact alone was insufficient to trigger strict scrutiny unless so strongly demonstrated that only intentional actions
could explain it. Id. at 239-42. This interpretation of the equal protection clause was reinforced by Arlington Heights. 429 U.S. at 265-66.
106. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976). See also the discussion in Arlington
Heights on the evidence needed to show invidious racial intent. 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977).
107. See discussion of disparate impact, as that concept has developed under Title VII,
in text accompanying note 138.
108. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
109. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1972). Once a prima facie
case has been established the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that the policies arise out of "business necessity," i.e., that they are essential to the operation of the
business and that no alternative means are available to achieve the same end with a less
discriminatory effect. The plaintiff may then rebut such a defense as pretextual. Id. at 792.
110. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). Intent under the statute has been interpreted to mean that acts are
done purposefully, regardless of motive. Id.
111. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358-60 (1977).
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ory were important, the holdings arguably should be reversed.
Under the higher standard of Title VII, the private action in
Weber should be disallowed, while the presumption in favor of the
state under equal protection should favor upholding the program
in Bakke, assuming that Bakke was decided on a constitutional basis."' The same argument would apply if Title VI were the basis of
the decision in Bakke, since a majority of the Court held that Title
VI imposed a standard of review equivalent to that imposed by the
equal protection clause.1 13
The different results in Bakke and Weber may perhaps be
traced to two unarticulated reasons. First, there is the difference in
the benefit involved: admission to medical school versus acceptance into a craft training program, or higher education"l4 versus
employment. Employment is a fundamental need as well as a
means to acquire other social benefits. The Court has shown a sensitivity to employment issues 1 which perhaps indicates a judgment that the end of economic discrimination may be the most
crucial step toward eliminating all racial discrimination. The educational benefit at issue in Bakke, by contrast, was admittance to
an elite profession. There was no question of insuring equal access
to basic educational training. On the contrary, a medical degree is
a highly limited benefit conferred on a chosen few after an intensely competitive process. Although the Court might seek to
guarantee that every person is able to secure employment commensurate with his skills and abilities and absent racial considera112. It was only Justice Powell, however, who reached the constitutional issue in Bakke,
and decided that under the standard of review imposed by the equal protection clause the
Davis program was impermissible. See note 40 supra. Justices Burger, Rehnquist, Stevens
and Stewart decided the case under Title VI, which they held to require stricter scrutiny
than the fourteenth amendment. See note 53 supra. In so holding, however, they represented a minority of the Court. 438 U.S. at 287, 336-37.
113. See 438 U.S. at 287 (opinion of Powell, J.), 325 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.) (1978).
114. Bakke is distinguishable from the line of school cases under Brown, where the focus
has been on mandatory education at the elementary and secondary levels. Post-secondary
education, by contrast, is voluntary and limited, with admissions standards necessarily imposed to determine access. An analogy in the employment area would be the difference between a non-skilled entry level position and a supervisory position justifiably requiring
knowledge or skill of the specific production process.
115. The Court has read Title VII broadly in defining discrimination. See text accompanying note 136 infra. The Court's attitude has been supportive of private litigants. See Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of PrivateEnforcement and Judicial Developments, 20 ST. Louis L.J. 228 (1976). The author points out that the first phase
of litigation under Title VII focused on procedural obstacles thrown up by defendants,
which the courts uniformly refused to allow to bar relief to private litigants. Id. at 231-45.
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tions, certainly it would recognize that admission to medical school
is inherently a limited opportunity.
Another perspective on the difference between employment and
education is the question of alternative means to achieve the goals
of the programs at issue. In Bakke the Court saw an alternative to
the Davis program: the "race as a factor" approach."' This alternative offered a means to achieve minority admissions without
utilizing the drastic remedy of an absolute quota and minimized
17
the impact of finding the Davis program impermissible.
In the Weber case, on the other hand, no less drastic alternative
was available. The "race as a factor" approach would not have
worked at Kaiser because the training program involved entry level
positions for which no qualifications were required. A possible alternative would have been to reduce the quota to a level lower
than the fifty percent set up by the plan. Such a solution, however,
would have required the Court to set a mathematical standard of
permissibility.1 8 Disallowing the program entirely would have
meant insuring the continuance of the racial status quo unless a
violation of Title VII. could have been proven. Thus, the impact of
a different decision in Weber would have virtually strangled all
voluntary affirmative action efforts.
These differences between the Bakke and Weber cases reflect

116. 438 U.S. at 316-18. Justice Powell specifically approved of the Harvard admissions
process, which was presented to the Court as an appendix to the amici curiae brief of Columbia, Harvard and Stanford Univeisities and the University of Pennsylvania. The
Harvard approach described the university's undergraduate admissions process, where race
could be taken into account, along with many other factors, to chose from the large pool of
academically qualified applicants. The complete Harvard presentation is reproduced in an
appendix to Justice Powell's opinion. Id. at 321-24.
117. Blacks as a percentage of all medical school graduates were 2.2% in 1970, 3.3% in
1973 and 5.0% in 1975. See 438 U.S. at 369 n.45. This represents an annual rate of increase
over the period 1970-1975 of 15.6%, or an annual rate for the period 1973-75 of 8.0%. At the
former rate of increase, a goal of 13% representation, which would be roughly proportional
to the population, would be achieved in approximately 16 years; at the latter rate, the time
needed would be ten years. Assuming, then, that medical schools would use the "race as a
factor" approach and accept minorities in comparable numbers to the pattern which produced the 1970-75 increase, the goal of proportional minority representation in medicine
could still be achieved.
118. In 1974, five of 273 skilled craft workers at the Gramercy plant were black. 99 S. Ct.
at 2725. Assuming that the number of annual openings in the training program remained
constant at the first year rate of 13, it would have taken 14 years to achieve the goal of 39%,
or 106 black workers, using the 50% ratio. The progress of the program would be affected,
of course, by fluctuations in the number of discharges, retirements, and the like; but a lower
percentage of blacks taken into the program would have greatly lengthened the period
needed to reach the goal.
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the dual patterns of litigation in the education and employment
areas. Civil rights litigation ineducation has focused on equal access to basic education at the elementary and secondary levels.11 '
Higher education presumably will eventually reflect the effects of
basic equal educational opportunity through a "filtering upward"
process. Thus, this approach looks to the future; the effects of unequal educational opportunity on those who have already been
through a discriminatory system remain a permanent disability.
Litigation in the employment field, by contrast, has been characterized by across-the-board attacks to eliminate the effects of prior
discriminatory practices as well as to prevent future discrimination
in employment.12 0 Within certain limitations, past discrimination
has not been permitted to "freeze an entire generation" of blacks;
instead, "make whole" relief has been required to restore blacks to
their "rightful place."'' The decisions in Bakke and Weber preserve this distinction. Bakke permits limited recognition of the effects of unequal educational opportunity, returning the focus again
to the elementary and secondary levels where equal access to the
education need to qualify for medical school should be insured.
Weber allows an immediate remedy before another generation is
affected.
Another possible reason for the different results in the cases is
the existence in Weber of evidence corroborating the claim of societal discrimination. This evidence included not only information
about the specific history of the Gramercy plant and the pattern of
racial disparity there, but perhaps more importantly, a long line of
Title VII cases involving pre- and post-Act discrimination in the
craft unions. 12 The cases demonstrated that craft union discrimination against blacks had been a nationwide practice. They showed
the impact of prior discrimination on present employment opportunities and the persistence, in some instances, of the unions' resistance to integration. They also provided a benchmark for assessing
the voluntary Kaiser program against the judicial remedies imposed in other cases."s

119. See generally O'Neil, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. Rav. 925 (1974).
120. See text accompanying notes 141-62 infro.
121. Note, Seniority Discriminationand the Incumbent Negro, 80 HAnv. L. Rsv. 1260
(1967).
122. See cases cited in note 155 infra.
123. Racial quotas, preferences and goals are common forms of relief ordered in the
union cases, and follow a pattern comparable to the voluntary action undertaken in the
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By comparison, in Bakke the Court had no significant prior
cases on preferential admissions to higher education. 12 ' The line of
school desegregation cases would have supported the inference that
Davis' general admissions standards had a discriminatory impact
on minorities who had been educationally disadvantaged. An inference based on the actual operation of objective admission standards, like college grades and MCAT scores, however, would have
been far stronger. There was no prior judicial experience in administering relief in this area to judge the reasonableness or necessity of the Davis plan. Furthermore, the admissions process involves academic decision-making, with
which the Court has
12
traditionally been reluctant to interfere. 5
Although these considerations may explain the different results
in the two cases, they do not resolve the inconsistency in the application of the concept of societal discrimination. They suggest a
compartmentalized approach to the issue of discrimination, where
the weight given to societal discrimination will vary according to
the area under consideration and the pattern of prior judicial findings. In the employment area, the Court will be willing to apply
the concept as a rationale for voluntary affirmative action.
WEBER AND TITLE

VII

The Weber decision is clearly consistent, however, with the pattern of Title VII litigation. It represents an approach consonant
with the purpose of Title VII and a logical progression in the use
of the concept of societal discrimination in defining discrimination
under the statute.
Kaiser plan. See, e.g., Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp., 382 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. La. 1974), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 538 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir.) cert. denied 434 U.S. 1051
(1976); EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n. Steamfitters' Local 638, 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976);
EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976); United
States v. Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973); Southern Ill.
Builders Ass'n v. Oglivie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972).
124. The only other case that has arisen on racially preferential admissions policies is
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). DeFunis involved law school admissions, but the
case was held moot because DeFunis had been admitted and completed his degree by the
time the case came up for review. Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the
case should have been remanded for further consideration of whether the admissions criteria used were culturally or racially biased. Thus, there was nothing in the record in either
Bakke or DeFunis examining the disparate impact on minorities of the use of grades and
test scores as primary admissions criteria. See Comment, The Case for Minority Representation in Reverse Discrimination Litigation, 67 CAL. L. R. 191 (1977). See also note 100
supra.
125. 438 U.S. at 404.

19801

Bakke and Weber
The Legislative History of Title VII

Title VII was enacted in 1964 in response to overwhelming evidence of racial discrimination in employment. 2 6 The racial disparity was dramatic: in 1962 the unemployment rate was 4.9% among
whites, 11.0% among blacks; median income in 1960 was $5,137 for
white males, $3,075 for black males. Blacks were concentrated in
the lower-paying occupations: in 1962, 16.7% of non-whites were
white collar workers, 39.5% were blue collar workers, 32.8% were
7
service workers, and 11.0% were farmworkers 1
Title VII was enacted as a remedial and enforcement measure to
achieve equal employment opportunity. Voluntary efforts were encouraged but recognized as insufficient.'
The elimination of discrimination in employment was crucial to the real enjoyment of
other rights guaranteed by the 1964 Civil Rights Act: as the House
Committee commented, "[t]he right the vote . . . does not have
29
much meaning on an empty stomach.'
When Title VII was amended in 1972, it remained obvious that
"minority groups [were] not obtaining their rightful place in our
society." 3 0 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was
given enforcement powers in recognition of the limited success of

126. H. Rep. No. 914, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in [1964] U.S. Code Cong. and
Ad. News 2355, 2391. Although discrimination on the basis of sex, national origin and religion was also prohibited by the statute, the major impetus for its passage was concern over
racial patterns in employment:
In various regions of the country there is discrimination against some minority
groups. Most glaring, however, is the discrimination against Negroes which exists
throughout our Nation. Today, more than 100 years after their formal emancipation, Negroes, who make up over 10 percent of our population, are by virtue of one
or another type of discrimination not accorded the rights, privileges, and opportunities which are considered to be, and must be, the birthright of all citizens. Id. at
2393.
127. Id. at 2513-16. The occupational groupings for whites in 1962 were: 47.3% white
collar, 35.4% blue collar, 10.6% service workers, 6.8% farm workers.
128. Id. at 2393:
No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and consequences
of racial and other types of discrimination against minorities. There is reason to
believe, however, that national leadership provided by the enactment of Federal
legislation dealing with the most troublesome problems will create an atmosphere
conducive to voluntary or local resolution of other forms of discrimination.(Emphasis added).
129. Id. at 2513.
130. H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong.
and Ad. News 2140. On the changes effected by the amendments, see Hart and Sape, Title
VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L.
REV.

824 (1973).
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the conciliation approach.' 3 ' Discriminatory practices were persistent and pervasive, as indicated by the mounting volume of
charges filed with the Commission.1 2 The realization had come
that employment discrimination was not primarily characterized
by overt, discrete acts, but rather was rooted in complex and subtle
patterns which 3 perpetuated historical and continuing social
13
discrimination.
Title VII thus reflects Congressional recognition of the need for
practical, realistic approaches to reach the goal of equal employment opportunity. It encourages voluntary action while insuring legal enforcement. The broad prohibitions of the statute are not
merely a negative command to cease discrimination, but impose a
positive duty to affirmatively act to eliminate the effects of
discrimination.
Societal Discrimination in Title VII Litigation
Judicial interpretation of Title VII has stressed the realistic
achievement of the goals of the statute. The courts do not wear
blinders when determining whether discrimination exists or how it
can be remedied. Rather, they consistently apply Title VII in the
social context out of which it arose. In defining what constitutes
discrimination, the courts have looked not only to intentional,
overt acts, but also to the more subtle, indirect impact of societal
discrimination upon employment decisions. Against this background the decision in Weber is a logical extension of the role societal discrimination has played in defining discrimination under Title VII.
"Discrimination" is not defined in Title VII; its definition has
evolved and continues to be developed through the course of litigation. A broad framework, however, exists, based on several Supreme Court decisions1 34 which focus on the questions of what ef131. H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2d Seas. -, reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong.
and Ad. News, 2140. In the first five years of the Commission's existence, less than half of
the charges where reasonable cause was found were partially or fully settled by conciliation.

Id.
132. Id. at 2139. In the first five years after its creation in 1965, the EEOC had received
over 52,000 charges, of which 35,445 had been recommended for investigation. Of these,
56% had been based on race, 23% on sex, and the remainder on national origin or religion.
In fiscal year 1969, the annual number of charges had risen to 12,148; it had increased to
14,129 in 1970 and to 14,644 in the first seven months of 1971. Id.
133. Id. at 2144. The 'legislative history specifically cited and expressed approval of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See text accompanying notes 141-52 infra.
134. Teamsters' v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
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fects are discriminatory and what types of conduct are
discriminatory.'8 5 Subsumed under discriminatory effects are the
well-settled theories of "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact." "Disparate treatment" means the use of race as an invidious
modifier of employment decisions, resulting in the denial of employment benefits based on that factor rather than on neutral and
uniform criteria.' Disparate treatment is most commonly alleged
in individual suits brought under Title VII and is often tied to conduct which is overtly racially discriminatory.1- 7 Where the imposition of facially neutral criteria results in a racially disproportionate
exclusion or denial of employment benefits, the effect is one of
"disparate impact."' 8 Disparate impact is commonly alleged in
class action suits and pattern-and-practice actions. " Discrimination against a class often reflects or incorporates societal
40
discrimination.1
What constitutes discriminatory conduct continues to be an area
of developing law. The broad outlines were set out by the Supreme
Court in the seminal case of Griggs v. Duke Power Company."" In
Griggs the Court established that Title VII was not limited to intentional, overt acts of discrimination. " Overt acts such as a re-

424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albermarle v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
135. Conduct and effect are not disjunctive categories of discrimination; conduct and its
effects are intertwined and both elements will be present in any Title VII violation. In the
development of the legal definition of discrimination, however, the issues have been examined separately by the courts. In some cases, the focus has been on effect and the question has been whether a racial disparity, either in treatment or in impact, existed. Cases
which focus on conduct have primarily been concerned with describing or delimiting the
employer's actions.
136. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
137. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Rowe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir.
1972).
138. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
139. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
140. See text accompanying notes 153 to 161 infra.
141. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, high school diploma and aptitude testing requirements were challenged for their discriminatory effects in disqualifying blacks at a disproportionate rate for hiring, promotion and transfer. The employer had segregated departments
until 1965. The diploma and testing requirements were instituted in 1955 for all new hires
and transfers except for the Labor Department, which was then all black. In 1965 the requirements were extended to all employment positions. Neither requirement was validated
or shown to be job related.
142. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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despite equal or superior qualifica-

tions, or an assignment of minorities to the lowest paid, least
desirable jobs 145 are clearly covered by the statute. This conduct is
prohibited not only because of the racial animus in the employment decision, but primarily because of its consequences. 146 The
employer's intent is not a determinant of legal liability.1 4' Good
intent does not repay wages lost, provide the
promotion denied, or
1 48
replace the opportunity to learn new skills.
The Court in Griggs also found that discrimination can occur
even without overt acts, through the incorporation of societal discrimination in employment practices.1 49 The Court focused on
those "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face and even
neutral in terms of intent,"150 that nonetheless constitute discrimination because they "operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."' 51 The Court also recognized
that some practices are "fair in form, but discriminatory in operation,

1 52

not because they perpetuate prior employment discrimi-

nation, but because they are based on present societal discrimination. Since Griggs, much of Title VII litigation has involved an
effort to define these practices.
The courts have found such "neutral" practices to exist in cases
involving changes in employment policies, made in response to Title VII, which operate to continue pre-Act segregation. For example, some employers "merged" formerly segregated lines of pro143. Gibson v. Local 40, Supercargoes and Checkers of the Int'l Longshoremen's and
Warehousemen's Union, 543 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1976); Peters v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 483
F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1973); Brown v. Rollins, 397 F. Supp. 571 (W.D.N.C. 1974).
144. White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp., 564 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1977); Gamble v. Birmingham R.R., 514 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1975); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d 888
(5th Cir. 1970).
145. Rice v. Gates Rubber Co., 521 F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d
418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906; United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446
F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971); Jones v. LeeWay Motor Freight, 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 954; Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
146. 401 U.S. at 432. "[Glood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
[such] employment procedures .... Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices." Id. (emphasis in original).
147. Id.
148. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
149. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
150. Id. at 430.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 431.
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gression by putting "black" jobs at the bottom of "white" jobs;18 8
or imposed new educational or testing requirements for promotion
into formerly all-white departments, but did not require them of
incumbent white employees. 15 ' Other cases have dealt with the
continuation of pre-Title VII policies which formerly operated in
the context of overt racial discrimination. Illustrative are the age
and experience requirements for union membership where the
union's past exclusion of blacks made it impossible for them to
meet the qualifications.'55 Another common pattern is the opening
up of formerly all-white positions to blacks while retaining the use
of departmental or unit seniority to restrict or deter transfer, or as
a preference factor in promotion. While all positions are now open
on a equal basis, blacks must give up employment security in their
old positions to be placed at the bottom of the seniority list in the
new department, with the prospect that they will never "catch up"
to the position they would have had but for the prior
15
discrimination."

153. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 409 (1975); White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp., 564 F.2d 1073, 1077 (4th Cir. 1977); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535
F.2d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 20; Stevenson v. International Paper Co.,
516 F.2d 103, 107 (5th Cir. 1975).
154. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975); Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474
F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
155. See, e.g., Crockett v. Green, 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976); Local 638, Sheet Metal
Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976); Gilmore v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 509
F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1975); Patterson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767
(2d Cir.), cert. denied 427 U.S. 911 (1975); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters' Local 638,
501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Local Union 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir.
1973); United States v. Wood, Wire and Metal Workers' Int'l Union Local 46, 471 F.2d 408
(2d Cir. 1973); S. Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v.
IBEW Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 943; United States v.
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Local 357, IBEW, 356 F. Supp. 104 (D. Nev. 1973); United States v. United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Indus., Local 24, 364 F. Supp. 808
(D.N.J. 1973); United States v. United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry, Local 73, 314 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
156. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); EEOC v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co.,
559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.
1976); United States v. N. L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971); Jones v. LeeWay Motor Freight Co., 431
F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970); Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526 (E.D.
Tex. 1974); Collins v. Union Carbide Corp., 371 F. Supp. 260 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Irvin v.
Mohawk Rubber Co., 308 F. Supp. 152 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279
F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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The most common employment practices challenged on the basis
that they are "fair in form, but discriminatory in operation" are
high school diploma requirements and general intelligence tests,
when used as qulifications for hiring or promotion. "7 These clearly
reflect the effects of societal discrimination.'5 Unless these qualifications are job-related or validated as predictive of performance or
capability, they are impermissible if they have a discriminatory impact.55 The courts have also disapproved of hiring and promotion
policies that rely heavily on subjective evaluation when the administrative and supervisory personnel making those evaluations are
predominantly white. 160 Wherever possible, employment decisions
are to be based on objective criteria closely tailored to the actual
qualifications needed for a particular job."'
A sensitivity to societal factors outside the specific acts of a particular employer or union permeates the definition of discrimination that has developed under Title VII. The theories of disparate
This has been a troublesome area for the courts because of the exemption for bona fide
seniority systems contained in Title VII. Section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1976) provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a
bona fide seniority .

.

. system ....

provided that such differences are not the

result of an intention to discriminate because of race ... or national origin...
The Supreme Court has interpreted this exemption to mean that prior discrimination which
is perpetuated by otherwise neutral seniority systems must have occurred since the effective
date of Title VII in order to be actionable. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54
(1977). See also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
157. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1978); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559
F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977); Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1975);
Watkins v. United Steelworkers of Amer. Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975); Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); Pettway v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906
(5th Cir. 1973); Collins v. Union Carbide Corp., 371 F. Supp. 260 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
158. "[C]hildhood deficiencies in the education and background of minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond their control, [should] not be allowed to work a cumulative and
invidious burden on such citizens for the remainder of their lives." McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973).
159. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-33 (1971).
160. See, e.g., Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 429
U.S. 70 (1976); Gilmore v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 509 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1975); Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Dickerson v. United States Steel
Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
161. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). This is the "business necessity"
test which has been very narrowly interpreted. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973); Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1976); Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
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treatment and disparate impact are founded on the presumption
that when a disparity exists in employment of blacks as compared
to whites it is usually attributable to race, not to some other factor.
Discriminatory conduct, as defined by the courts, may include neutral or fair policies undertaken in good faith. Thus, the concept of
societal discrimination has been implicit in the legal definition of
discrimination, although legal liability has always been premised
on specific conduct and demonstrable discriminatory effects.""2
The Impact of Weber: Societal Discrimination and Voluntary
Action
The decision in Weber takes the concept of societal discrimination a step further. It permits societal discrimination to be the sole
basis for voluntary affirmative action.
Societal discrimination was found in Weber to be a sufficient basis to justify a racially preferential program. The Court upheld a
remedial effort as drastic as the most extreme relief granted in Title VII litigation.6 3 Racial preference in this context is not, however, equivalent to invidious racial discrimination.'" Rather, it is a
necessary means of achieving racial equality and of adjusting employment expectations which are based on a long history of discrimination. It is a practical, realistic means for minorities to
achieve their "rightful place."
A less drastic approach could "freeze" the status quo for another
generation. Title VII was enacted to avoid that result and affirma162. The Title VII practitioner who exercises moderate care in the selection of cases
to take to court may confidently anticipate a successful conclusion to the litigation
in virtually every instance. The primary reason for this optimistic view is that the
racist and sexist character of our culture is so pervasive that it is almost impossible for an employer of any size to have avoided incorporating unlawful practices
into the everyday operations of the enterprise.
Specter and Spiegelman, Employment Discrimination Action under Federal Civil Rights
Acts, 21 AM. Jus. TRiALs 1, 125 (1974).
163. See note 94 supra.
164. It does not expressly or implicitly pin a badge of inferiority on whites. It does not
cut off any employment benefit; rather, it limits the expectations of achieving that benefit.
Those employment expectations are arguably premised on the existence of discrimination,
for it is expected that whites will have a better opportunity to gain the skills, education and
experience to qualify for a job, and that if whites are measured against blacks with equal or
even superior qualifications, whites will be hired because of race. Thus to uphold these expectations under the rubric of "reverse discrimination" is to permit continued reliance on,
and benefit from, societal discrimination. See EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local
638, 542 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir. 1976); Patterson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union,
514 F.2d 767, 775 (2d Cir. 1975); Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp., 382 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. La.
1974), rev'd in part on other grounds, 538 F:2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1976).
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tively eliminate the effects of discrimination. As Justice Brennan
observed in Weber:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern
over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot
of those who had "been excluded from the American dream for so
long," . . . constituted the first legislative prohibition of all vol-

untary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.' e
The Weber decision recognized the context in which Title VII
arose and is consistent with the legislative purpose for its enactment. It is also in accord with the pattern of judicial relief granted
under Title VII, which has sought to restore blacks to their "rightful place" and remove all vestiges of discrimination wherever possible. Weber recognized that such action should be encouraged on a
voluntary basis, and thereby avoided the legal paradox of prohibiting affirmative action unless the employer has violated Title VII.
Title VII operates as a statement of what cannot be done, not as a
limitation on what should be done.
Weber, however, does not hold that whites can have no cause of
action for invidious discrimination nor that race-conscious affirmative action programs will be uniformly upheld.1 " The Court carefully points out the factors relevant to its decision, suggesting that
a race-conscious program must be reasonable, fair, and limited 167
to
achieving a result justified by evidence of societal discrimination.
Weber established that voluntary action should not be unduly
restrained from using reasonable and effective means to remedy
general patterns of employment discrimination. It reassures private employers that reliance on general evidence of persisting employment discrimination as a basis for instituting affirmative ation
will not result in legal liability. " On the one hand, the voluntary
165. 99 S. Ct. at 2728.
166. Although violations of Title VII are most frequently claimed by minorities, it is
settled that whites may also sue under either that statute or the Reconstruction Statutes. In
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), white employees, who were
discharged for stealing, claimed discrimination because a black employee charged with the
same offense was not discharged. The Court held that the complaint stated a claim under
both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
167. 99 S.Ct. at 2730.
168. A case challenging Congressional authority to mandate affirmative action was
granted certiorari May 21, 1979, by the U.S. Supreme Court. Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d
600 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted 99 S. Ct. 2403 (1979). The statute in question is Section
103(f)(2) of the 1977 Public Works Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2), which requires
that 10% of federal funds for public works projects be used on bids submitted by businesses
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actions of an employer committed to equal employment opportunity are supported and encouraged. On the other hand, a recalcitrant employer who has committed "arguable violations" of Title
VII can be urged to institute voluntary affirmative action as an alternative to private or government suits under the statute. The
knowledge that voluntary programs will be upheld may therefore
be a valuable negotiating tool and promote conciliation.
The decision also indirectly supports judicially-imposed racial
preferences and quotas. The Court relied on prior case history of
craft union discrimination where these types of remedies had been
imposed. 6"9 By upholding a voluntary race-conscious program, the
Court implicitly approved preferential quotas as a proper exercise
of equitable relief. 170 It is unlikely that the courts will significantly
expand the use of such remedies or view them as other than extreme. Certainly a court-ordered preference is distinguishable from
one voluntarily adopted; but the underlying concept of preference
as a valid means to remedy employment discrimination is the
same.
CONCLUSION

Weber provides a basis for remedying discrimination which is
beyond the scope of Title VII. Pre-Act conduct and general societal discrimination not actionable under the statute can be reached
by voluntary affirmative action. Title VII litigation, when viewed
in this perspective, is merely one means to correct discrimination,
rather than the strict limit on what can or should be done. Weber
recognizes that the attainment of equal opportunity is not solely
the responsibility of judicial enforcement and administration. The
decision provides support and encouragement for private voluntary
action to achieve the goal of racial equality based on a realistic
assessment of the social matrix of discrimination.
The extension in Weber of the use of the concept of societal discrimination has significant implications. It reaffirms the desirability and legitimacy of voluntary affirmative action. Bakke indicated

which are at least 50% minority-owned. The issues presented are whether the statute violates Title VII and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. For a
discussion of the issues raised, see Leventhal, ACES Back to Bakke, 65 A. B. A. L. J. 214
(1979). Affirmative action based on Congressional findings and authority would arguably
stand on even a stronger basis than the private action upheld in Weber.
169. 99 S, Ct. at 2725 n.1.
170. Although quota relief has been ordered by the courts, see note 94 supra, the permissibility of such relief has never been expressly ruled on by the Supreme Court.
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that affirmative action programs in educational admissions could
not justify racial quotas on this basis. Weber insures that the concept can be applied in the employment sector. Recognition of societal discrimination is essential to achieving social equality, and application of the concept should be extended to other areas of civil
rights ligitation.
Nancy E. Dowd

